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ere are various studies and researches about Fukushima nuclear accident even in the eld of so-
cial science. In this article, the author divides those social science studies into the following four groups. 
First, Prof. Kikkawa’s studies focus on social and industrial behaviour of Japan’s electric power in-
dustry. Japan’s electric power industry is regulated by regional monopoly, integration from power gener-
ation to distribution, and electric pricing system based on assets and costs by the government. According 
to his studies, these factors in Japan’s electric power industry are main fundamental causes for Fukushi-
ma nuclear accident. 
Second, the coalition among nuclear industry, government, business community, politician, and 
mass media to promote nuclear power is a main cause of Fukushima nuclear accidents （such as Prof. 
Yoshioka）.
ird, business model of nuclear industry is a main cause of Fukushima nuclear accident. Prof. 
Takemori’s study focuses on lack of competitive market for nuclear power industry and lack of rational 
back end technology for high level radioactive waste.
Fourth, institutional architecture of nuclear safety regulation in Japan is a main cause of Fukushima 
nuclear accidents by many studies.
Absolutely, the causes of Fukushima nuclear accident are a series of many factors, even focusing on 
social aspects. However, this article stands on fourth position to analyse safety regulation system in Japan 
and to make clear and independent future regulatory system. Moreover, this paper recognizes that we 
don’t have a perfect regulation system and each regulation heavily depends on social capacity of regula-
tory agency, regulated industry, and the society. In 21 century’s regulation, we have to think more about 
how to accelerate spontaneous environmental innovation by regulation.
en, brief history of Japan’s nuclear safety regulation can be described three phases. 
First phase is from 1957 to 1977. Regulatory system in this period is a sort of mixed regulatory sys-
tem based on Science and Technology Agency, MITI, and Nuclear Committee.
Second phase is from 1978 to 1999. METE and Nuclear Safety Committee becomes two main regu-
latory agencies in this period.
ird phase is from 2000 to 2011. Government took a measure of enforcement of Nuclear Safety 
Committee and creation of Nuclear Safety Institute under METE.
is paper especially focuses on the third phase and analyse several important features. First point 
is double checking （DC） system. Is DC system eective or not? Does it makes unclear about which is 
main actor in the case of emergency? Second point is technical and social independence of regulatory 
agencies. All issues end up to the social capacity problem and how can we make eective regulation? Es-
sentially, does social regulation is enough for nuclear safety?
 is article will discuss these points based upon Japan’s social context and will propose next regula-
tory system aer Fukushima nuclear accident.
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れはまさにポーター仮説 （Porter Hypothesis） である。1991年，ハーバードの著名な経営学者マイケ
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新聞 2012, p. 68）としているが，問題はそうした混乱状況の中でも，あらかじめ決まっている手順や
プロセスを柔軟に活用し，臨機応変に対応しつつ，必要かつ可能な情報を最大限活用し，出来るだけ
手順を踏まえたプロセスを進行・管理することであろう。いわば生態管理において強調される順応的
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が配分されていた（吉岡 2011b, p. 141）。
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3 e Economist （2012）, “ e Fukushima black box: a dangerous lack of urgency in drawing lessons from Japan’s nuclear di-
saster”, e Economist, January 7th, 2012. また，英エコノミスト誌の東日本大震災・福島原発事故の1周年の特集号e Econ-
omist, March 10th, 2012には，”Japan aer the 3/11 disaster, e death of trust”, “e dream that failed: Nuclear power will not 
go away, but its role may never be more than marginal, says Oliver Morton”, “Safety Blow-ups happened: Nuclear plants can 
be kept safety only by constantly worrying about their dangers”などの非常に興味深い記事が掲載されている。http://www.
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たことに問題はな い。しかし，後に述べるように国際原子力機関 （IAEA） 安全基準では，事故時においても規制機関の実質
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